Why are shipyard order books filled through 2029–2030?

  • At the Chinese shipyards visited by Goldman Sachs, orders at leading yards are largely booked through 2029 or even 2030. New shipyards are constrained by government approvals, and capacity expansion relies more on extending dry docks and upgrading equipment; marine-engine orders are also booked through 2030.
  • This means that industry order-taking is constrained by available capacity: Goldman Sachs believes that current new orders reflect more how much existing capacity can handle than total underlying demand. Tight engine supply could slow delivery of new orders across the industry, while shipyards with long-term partnerships with engine makers or the ability to supply their own engines are better positioned.

How long can order demand continue?

  • Driven by fleet renewal, environmental regulations, supply-chain diversification and geopolitical disruptions, interviewed executives expect shipbuilding demand to remain resilient through 2032–2035; Goldman Sachs expects the current upcycle to last at least through 2032. Tankers are a stronger area of demand, and shipowners are still seeking slots before the end of 2029.
  • Container-ship orders are also supported, but freight markets are not broadly strong: the industry expects container freight rates to come under pressure in 2027, while shipping companies may continue ordering large vessels to pursue market share, given their strong earnings and balance sheets. Goldman Sachs says shipyards report ample inquiries for container ships, with order momentum expected to continue through 2027.

Can capacity expansion quickly ease supply tightness?

  • Hengli Heavy Industries is one of the few cases of active expansion. Goldman Sachs expects its capacity to double in 2027 and its global market share to reach 11%; company management plans to deliver 130 and 250 ships in 2027 and 2028, respectively.
  • Hengli management says measures such as standardized production and moving more work to workshops on land can shorten dock time by 20%–30%, and release 58 additional delivery slots in 2027–2028. Meanwhile, Yangzijiang’s revived Runze shipyard project is still awaiting government approval; Goldman Sachs estimates that it could add about 30% of existing capacity, but the timing of its start-up is uncertain.

Why does a stronger ship price not necessarily mean expanding profits?

  • Tight supply helps shipyards defend prices. Hengli has reduced and eliminated discounts to market prices this year; Goldman Sachs cites its new VLCC orders at 140 million dollars per vessel, above the market price of 131 million dollars. Yangzijiang says contracted prices in 2025–2026 were broadly comparable with those in 2024, while some peers offered discounts of 2%–3%.
  • Costs are still rising: Yangzijiang management says labor accounts for about 20% of total costs, and marine-engine prices are increasing; engines typically account for 10%–20% of a new ship’s price. For every 1% appreciation of the yuan against the U.S. dollar, the company’s gross margin is pressured by about 0.4–0.5 percentage points. Shipyards’ pricing power, cost control and exchange-rate movements therefore jointly determine whether profits can keep pace with ship prices.