What do the new rules add to previous chip export controls?
- The US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) requires US government review before chips are sold to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Brazil; it also restricts Chinese companies from renting computing capacity overseas. Providing Chinese companies with computing capacity above 12 million TPP requires a US export license.
- The rules also close a loophole that allowed Chinese chip-design companies to use advanced manufacturers such as TSMC and Samsung for contract manufacturing, and cover both existing and newly signed computing arrangements: applications for existing arrangements must be filed within 90 days, with approvals handled case by case.
Why doesn’t tighter regulation mean a simultaneous decline in global demand for computing capacity?
- The rules do not prohibit Chinese developers from using all cloud computing capacity outside China: cloud services in unaffected regions remain available to them, including data centers located in the US. US companies can also sell computing capacity to China when the GPUs are located within the US. Some demand may therefore shift to other deployment locations rather than disappear outright.
- Morgan Stanley believes near-term demand for computing capacity remains above supply, with chip manufacturing capacity, memory, and data-center land, power and facility conditions still the main constraints. However, if licenses in affected regions are delayed by several months, project commissioning, utilization ramp-up and pricing could slow; the impact could also deepen if restrictions continue to expand.
Which cloud businesses and data centers are more likely to be affected first?
- Downside risks for Chinese cloud service providers have increased. Based on cloud revenue for fiscal 2029–2031 implied by management, Morgan Stanley previously estimated that 17%–20% was exposed to risk; the firm considers the new rules stricter than the proposals it assessed previously. Alibaba Cloud’s more visible supply of self-developed chips is viewed as a relative buffer compared with peers.
- The main pressure in Southeast Asia is a reduction in China-related overseas AI workloads, slowing leasing and the ramp-up in utilization, with greater downside risk to capacity forecasts in Malaysia and Thailand. Pressure may first show up in GPU rental prices and uncontracted computing capacity. Singapore is relatively resilient: all of Singtel’s first batch of DGX GB300 computing capacity had been committed before deployment, with demand mainly coming from local government and enterprise workloads.
How do Morgan Stanley’s regional and sector views reflect this divergence?
- The firm reiterated its overweight ratings on Japan and South Korea, and its relative preference for both over Taiwan: Japan and South Korea are less affected by the new trade controls, and the related investment cycle is driven more by industrial, defense and energy capital expenditure. Taiwan remains market weight, partly because of higher valuations; small- and mid-cap technology supply chains are also more vulnerable to a slowdown in data-center expansion.
- The firm remains market weight on China, but prefers A-shares over H-shares and MSCI China. It is overweight domestic technological self-sufficiency, believing that external restrictions will strengthen the impetus to substitute domestic computing capacity, semiconductor equipment and materials. It reiterated its underweight rating on internet companies, citing greater uncertainty over AI infrastructure expansion and commercial returns because of restricted access to advanced computing capacity.
- For Southeast Asian country allocations, Morgan Stanley is overweight Singapore and Thailand, market weight Malaysia and underweight Indonesia. The report also says data-center deployments serving US multinationals and hyperscalers are unaffected by the new rules, and that customer quality and business mix will differentiate operators.
At what pace could further tightening be implemented?
- Morgan Stanley outlines three possible paths: additional legislation from Congress, implementation of existing BIS rules alone, or the government easing approvals and moving close to the status quo. The firm believes the overall direction favors more restrictions, but legislation remains constrained by the congressional calendar, the need to reconcile versions from the two chambers, and the government’s consideration of bilateral relationship stability.
- Even if the relevant provisions pass, the measures have different certification periods and effective dates, and implementation could continue through 2027 and beyond. Whether allies take action in parallel will also affect the eventual scope of coverage.